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INTRODUCTION
Selling counterfeit goods, especially replicas of expensive designer
accessories, is rampant around the world. In fact, the International
Chamber of Commerce estimates that, by 2015, the value of counterfeit
1
goods around the world will exceed $1.7 trillion. In most big cities,
visitors can find small shops or cardboard fold-up tables selling
imitation luxury purses, scarves, watches, and sunglasses, and New
York City is no exception.
Designers of nearly every type of item—clothes, accessories, and
electronics—create and use symbols, marks, and words that, over time,
become synonymous with their brand and its quality, and eventually are
2
afforded protection under trademark laws. Those who use these marks
in connection with other goods without permission from the mark
owner are in violation of trademark laws and are subject to civil and
3
criminal penalties. Although the manufacturers and sellers of such
counterfeit goods are arguably the “guiltiest” participants, countless
counterfeit goods are purchased, used, and flaunted every day by people
who know, or should know, that the goods are not genuine.
Currently, there are no federal, state, or local laws that punish
buyers of counterfeit goods. New York City in recent years has
4
attempted to combat counterfeiting by punishing sellers, not buyers. In
April 2011, New York City Councilwoman Margaret Chin proposed a
local law that would impose criminal penalties, including possible jail
5
time, for purchasers of counterfeit goods. Councilwoman Chin’s
proposed legislation sets out two alternative mens rea requirements for a
conviction under this proposed law: that the defendant either knew or
6
should have known that the item bought was not genuine. The latter
mens rea term, should have known, however, is not mentioned in New
1
Steve Hargreaves, Counterfeit Goods Becoming More Dangerous, CNN MONEY (Sept.
27, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/09/27/news/economy/counterfeit-goods/index.html.
2
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 cmt. g (2012) (discussing the
present breadth of trademark law).
3
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§
25:14, 25:15 (4th ed. 2011).
4
Ross Tucker, Counterfeit Crackdown: New York Police Shutter Canal Street
Buildings,
WOMEN’S
WEAR
DAILY
(Feb.
28,
2008),
http://gibney.com/p/bb10a56b8c7e85544ea6ff9b8c5dab4b987a975f.
5
Int.
No.
544
§
10-902
(2011),
available
at
http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=885894&GUID=926F900B7A1E-48E8-991D-6A3CFE24EA90&Options=&Search=.
6
Int. No. 544 § 10-902(2).
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York’s Penal Code and has not been clearly defined by New York
courts. Despite this ambiguity, the law is beneficial because it is likely
to substantially combat trademark infringement and the current vague
understanding of the phrase “should have known” can easily be clarified
by the legislation and future court opinions.
Part I of this Note discusses theories of criminal punishment and
the mens rea requirement in criminal law generally and under the New
York Penal Code. Part II provides a background of trademark law,
federal and New York state trademark regulation, and the requirements
of trademark infringement actions. In Part III, this Note provides a
factual background of the counterfeit goods market in New York City.
Part IV introduces the proposed local law intended to provide a source
for criminal actions against purchasers of counterfeit goods in New
York City. Finally, Parts V and VI analyze the mens rea requirements of
the proposed New York City legislation, examine similar laws in other
U.S. states and foreign countries, and discuss why the proposed law
comports with theories of criminal punishment and public policy.
I.

The Mens Rea Requirement in Criminal Law
A. Theories of Criminal Punishment
7

Criminal law is meant to punish wrongdoing. Punishment can be
manifested in a variety of ways, including fines, community service,
8
imprisonment, or even the death penalty. The two dominant
justifications for punishment arise from two divergent penological
9
theories: retributivism (or deontology) and utilitarianism. These
theories postulate that punishment is justified by the public’s perceived
desire to punish wrongdoers (retributivism) and its need to punish
10
criminals in order to deter future criminal behavior (utilitarianism).
One authority succinctly described the difference in the theories as
follows: “a retributivist claims that punishment is justified because
people deserve it; a utilitarian believes that justification lies in the useful
7
John Hasnas, The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of Corporate Criminal
Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329, 1336 (2009).
8
SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, & CAROL S. STEIKER, CRIMINAL LAW
AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 67 (8th ed. 2007).
9
Matthew Haist, Comment: Deterrence in a Sea of “Just Deserts”: Are Utilitarian
Goals Achievable In a World of “Limiting Retributivism”?, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
789, 793 (2009).
10
Hasnas, supra note 7, at 1336.
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11

purposes that punishment serves.”
The retributive theory is based on the traditional “eye-for-an-eye”
concept that seeks to justify punishment based on the offender’s moral
12
culpability. The nineteenth century English judge and proponent of
retributivism, Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, stated that, “the infliction of
punishment by law gives definite expression and a solemn ratification
and justification to the hatred which is excited by the commission of the
13
offence[.]” This theory also reflects society’s desire to punish those
14
who violate the law and is rooted in morality. It assumes that all people
15
are moral actors capable of making good versus evil choices. Those
who follow the retributivist school of thought also believe that it is not
only morally better if a wrongdoer is punished than if he is not, but that
16
retributivism imposes a duty on society to punish. In fact, scholars
have asserted that society’s act of punishing a wrongdoer is not only
17
reasonably good, but morally good.
Retributivists have set forth several different sub-theories. Some
retributivists believe that there is a delicate balance between the benefits
and burdens of living in a society that relies on each member’s respect
18
for the rights of others. When the law is broken, the balance is
19
disrupted. The condemnation of punishment, however, takes away any
advantage gained through the misconduct and restores the benefit20
burden balance. For other retributivists, laws serve a morally educative
21
purpose and persuade citizens to act a certain way. Punishment not
only reaffirms this moral code, but not punishing a wrongdoer would
11
Kent Greenawalt, Commentary: Punishment, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 343, 347
(1st ed. 1983).
12
KADISH, SCHULHOFER, & STEIKER, supra note 8, at 79.
13
SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW IN ENGLAND 81-82
(1883),
available
at
https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=apbaAAAAMAAJ&rdid=bookapbaAAAAMAAJ&rdot=1.
14
Haist, supra note 9, at 795; Hasnas, supra note 7, at 1336.
15
RICHARD J. BONNIE, ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 7 (3d ed. 2010).
16
Todd R. Clear, Harm in American penology: offenders, victims, and their
communities 9 (1994); Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in
RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER AND EMOTIONS 179 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987).
17
HERBERT MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 33-34 (1976); H. L. A. HART,
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 231-32 (1968).
18
Clear, supra note 16, at 9 (citing Kant (1887)).
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 10.
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22

itself be immoral. Others simply view laws as prohibiting immoral
23
acts. Because U.S. citizens are free to make their own decisions, if
someone makes a morally bad decision, society condemns that decision
24
and demands punishment. Punishment not only makes the
condemnation tangible, but it also symbolizes the moral reprehensibility
25
of the act.
26
Because retributivists believe punishment must be deserved,
maintaining proportionality between a crime and its punishment is
27
crucial. This requires an assessment of the moral culpability of the
28
wrongdoer based on the severity of the crime. Today’s criminal system
implements proportionality by grading offenses using a degree system
29
and by labeling crimes as either misdemeanors or felonies.
Although the majority of scholarship today focuses on
retributivism, today’s criminal justice system is largely based on the
30
work and beliefs of eighteenth century utilitarian reformers. The main
31
goal of utilitarianism is to increase the net happiness of society.
Criminal punishment accomplishes this by setting an example for
society and preventing future offenses through deterrence,
32
incapacitation, and rehabilitation.
Deterrence is effectuated when the threat of punishment prevents a
would-be criminal from engaging in illegal activity because the cost of
33
punishment outweighs the benefit of committing the crime. In other
words, when one wishes to avoid punishment to a sufficient extent, he
will not commit a crime. Thus, the deterrence theory suggests that
greater penalties will lead to less crime by raising the cost of
committing the crime. Deterrence theory applies to both past criminals,
whose unpleasant punishment deters them from committing another
22

Id.
Id.
24
Haist, supra note 9, at 793-94.
25
Clear, supra note 16, at 10.
26
JOHN KAPLAN, ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 32 (6th ed. 2008).
27
MORRIS, supra note 17, at 33-34; HART, supra note 17, at 231-32.
28
BONNIE, ET AL., supra note 15, at 12.
29
Id.
30
KAPLAN, ET AL., supra note 26, at 31.
31
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 14 (4th ed. 2006); Haist, supra
note 9, at 794.
32
BONNIE, ET AL., supra note 15, at 3; Haist, supra note 9, at 794; Moore, supra note 16,
at 179.
33
Haist, supra note 9, at 794; KADISH, SCHULHOFER, & STEIKER, supra note 8, at 92.
23
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crime, and would-be criminals, who are deterred by the threat of
punishment without ever having experienced it.
Incapacitation involves the simple idea of protecting the public by
34
physically preventing criminals from committing additional crimes.
Facilities like jails and prisons are designed and operated for this
35
purpose. In fact, despite the high costs, some argue that prisons “pay
36
big dividends” because of a prison’s ability to incapacitate criminals.
Rehabilitation involves two goals: first, to make criminals safe to
return to society to make the streets safer, and, second, to rehabilitate
criminals so that they can not only return to society, but so that they can
37
lead productive, successful lives in the general public. In fact, studies
38
indicate that rehabilitation is effective in achieving these societal goals.
In reality, the American criminal system is a composite of these
39
and other penological theories. Different punishment justifications are
40
exercised at different times. The New York Penal Code, for example,
states multiple reasons for its outlined punishments:
The general purposes of the provisions of this chapter are . . . [t]o
insure the public safety by preventing the commission of offenses
through the deterrent influence of the sentences authorized, the
rehabilitation of those convicted . . . and their confinement when
41
required in the interests of public protection.
42

Seemingly contrary to the Constitution’s promises of freedom,
criminal law permits the government to take away a person’s freedom
and property—and sometimes their life—both metaphorically and

34
KADISH, SCHULHOFER, & STEIKER, supra note 8, at 101-02 (citing FRANKLIN E.
ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT
OF CRIME (9th ed. 1995) (arguing that incapacitation is the central objective of criminal
punishment)).
35
Id. at 101.
36
John J. DiIulio, Jr., Prisons are a Bargain, by Any Measure, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16,
1996, at A17, available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/1996/01/16crimejohn-j-diiulio-jr (positing that, despite high prison costs, the price of imprisoning a man is
half that society would pay if he were let free).
37
KADISH, SCHULHOFER, & STEIKER, supra note 8, at 98.
38
See id. at 99-101.
39
BONNIE, ET AL., supra note 15, at 3.
40
Id.
41
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05 (Consol. 2013).
42
U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that “no person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.”).
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43

literally. Because wrongful convictions are inherent in the legal
system, and because U.S. citizens place a high value on the rights to life
and liberty, the U.S. has historically been wary of criminalizing acts for
44
fear of wrongfully depriving an innocent person of his rights. This idea
is based on William Blackstone’s famous statement that “it is better that
45
ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer.” Thus, before a
criminal law is enacted, the purpose and value of the law and resultant
criminal punishment must be evaluated and compared with the
harmfulness of the wrongful act. Only then can it be determined if it is
logical to enact the new law.
B. Mens Rea in New York
Almost every criminal law has two main elements, an actus reus
and a mens rea. Actus reus requires that a voluntary act or omission has
46
occurred. Mens rea requires that the actor possessed a culpable state of
47
mind. Because of the nature of criminal punishment and the general
caution typically exercised before enacting a criminal law, any potential
holes or uncertainties in these elements will make a law less than ideal.
The requisite level of mens rea varies by crime and
48
jurisdiction. Although not adopted word-for-word, the mens rea
standards in New York’s Penal Code are based on the Model Penal
49
Code (“MPC”). New York divides culpability into four levels of
mental states: intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, and criminal
50
negligence. The highest level, “intentionally,” is present when a person
acts with the “conscious objective” to cause a specific result or to act as

43

Hasnas, supra note 7, at 1335.
Id. at 1335-36.
45
Id. at 1335 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 359 (Wayne Morrison ed., Routledge-Cavendish 2001) (1769)).
46
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01.
47
Id. § 2.02; 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 37 (2012); 35 N.Y. JUR. 2D Criminal Law:
Substantive Principles and Offenses §§ 21-22 (2012). Some crimes, such as statutory rape,
are strict liability crimes that do not have a mens rea element.
48
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (describing varying levels of culpable mental states); 35
N.Y. JUR. 2D Criminal Law: Substantive Principles and Offenses §§ 21-22 (2012).
49
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02; Paul H. Robinson & Marckus Dirk Dubber, An
Introduction
to
the
Model
Penal
Code
3
(1999),
http://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/phrobins/intromodpencode.pdf.
50
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05. In contrast, the MPC uses the four mental states of
purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and negligently. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2).
44
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51

he did. New York’s “intentionally” standard is essentially equivalent to
52
the MPC’s “purposely” mens rea standard. The next level of mens rea
in New York, referred to as “knowingly,” occurs when a person is
“aware” of the connection between his conduct or the circumstances and
53
the offense. A very fine line separates the “knowingly” and
54
“intentionally” standards. While “intentionally” requires a conscious
objective to cause a result by specific conduct, “knowingly” requires
merely an awareness that the result is practically certain to result from
55
conduct.
56
The third level of mental culpability in New York is “recklessly.”
This occurs when “[a] person acts recklessly with respect to a [criminal]
57
result or to a circumstance.” In cases of recklessness, the actor must
have consciously disregarded a risk, and the risk must be so “substantial
and unjustifiable” that it “constitutes a gross deviation” from the way a
58
reasonable person would act under the same circumstances.
59
The final mens rea level in New York is criminal negligence. A
person acts with criminal negligence with respect to a result or to a
circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he fails to
perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or
60
that such circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and
degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from
the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the
61
situation. This final level of mens rea in New York is essentially the
62
equivalent of the MPC’s “negligently” requirement. Some argue that
negligent behavior, where the actor was not aware of a threat of
punishment and did not act with a guilty mind, should never have penal

51

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(1).
Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(1), with MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a).
53
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(2).
54
Paula Gormley, The New York State Penal Law: A Supplement to Professor Matthew
Lippman’s Contemporary Criminal Law, First Edition, at 38, available at
http://www.sagepub.com/lippmanstudy/state/ny/ (last updated Aug. 2008).
55
Id.
56
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(3).
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(4).
60
Id.; MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES PART I, at 229-44 (1985).
61
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(4).
62
Compare id. with MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d).
52
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63

consequences.
II.

Trademark Law
A. General Background

Trademark law prohibits competitors from using marks in a way
64
that will confuse consumers as to a good’s manufacturer or affiliation.
Such marks can be a word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination of these, that is used to indicate the source of a good or
65
service. Trademark law aims to protect both valid trademark owners
66
and the public. In passing the Lanham Act that regulates federal
trademark law, Congress stated that the purpose of trademark regulation
is two-fold:
[first,] to protect the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing
a product bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably knows,
it will get the product which it asks for and wants to get . . . [and
s]econdly, where the owner of a trade-mark has spent energy, time,
and money in presenting to the public the product, he is protected in
67
his investment from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats.

When successful, this allows consumers to rely on certain marks of a
good to identify the source, and, thereby, to recognize other
68
characteristics, such as the quality, of that good. This protects a
trademark owner’s business in a variety of ways, including by
preventing lost sales that result when others sell imitation items for less
69
without having to invest in the development of the good. Trademark
70
law also helps limit damage to a creator’s reputation through dilution.
63
BONNIE, ET AL., supra note 15, at 209 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES
PART I, at 229-44 (1985)); Jerome Hall, Negligent Behavior Should be Excluded from Penal
Liability, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 632, 634-37 (1963).
64
MCCARTHY, supra note 3, at § 2:2.
65
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9.
66
Id.
67
S.
REP.
NO.
79-1333,
at
3-4
(1946),
available
at
http://ipmall.info/hosted_resources/lipa/trademarks/PreLanhamAct_026_HR_1333.pdf; see
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9.
68
S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 4 (“To protect trade-marks, therefore, is to protect the public
from deceit, to foster fair competition, and to secure to the business community the
advantages of reputation and good will by preventing their diversion form (sic) those who
have created them to those who have not.”).
69
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9.
70
Id. Dilution occurs when the strength of a mark’s association with the plaintiff creator
or company is decreased and the mark’s good name or reputation is tarnished. Id.
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The protection that trademark law affords creates incentives for
manufacturers and retailers to create and produce new and inventive
items for the public because they can trust that the law will protect their
71
products and their ability to sell and make a profit. It also leads to a
more efficient, competitive, and productive marketplace that benefits
72
creators, sellers, and buyers alike.
B. Regulation of Trademark Law
While federal law strictly regulates both patent law and copyright
73
law, trademark law is the subject of both state and federal regulation.
The federal Lanham Act provides a means for creators to register
trademarks with the federal Patent and Trademark Office and is a basis
for relief for infringement, even in some situations in which a mark is
74
unregistered.
Before the Act took effect in 1947, there was no federal trademark
protection in the U.S. because it was unclear whether or not Congress
75
had the power to regulate this area of law. In 1879, the Supreme Court
decided In re Trade-Mark Cases and held that the federal government’s
power to regulate trademark law stems from the Constitution’s
Commerce Clause and Congress’s power to “regulate commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian
76
Tribes.”
In general, however, the Lanham Act does not directly preempt
77
state trademark law. Rather, states are granted the power to pass their

71

MCCARTHY, supra note 3, at § 2:3.
Id.
73
Id. §§ 5:3, 22:2.
74
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1129 (2005); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 3, at § 5:4.
75
MCCARTHY, supra note 3, at § 5:3. In fact, in In re Trade-Mark Cases, the Supreme
Court held that Congress does not have power to regulate trademarks under the
Constitution’s patent and copyright clause. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; In re
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879)).
76
In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94-95 (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3).
77
E.g., Colonial Penn Grp., Inc. v. Colonial Deposit Co., 834 F.2d 229, 234 n.3 (1st Cir.
1987); Spartan Food Sys., Inc. v. HFS Corp., 813 F.2d 1279, 1284 (4th Cir. 1987); Keebler
Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 372 (1st Cir. 1980); La Chemise Lacoste v.
Alligator Co., Inc., 506 F.2d 339, 346 (3d Cir. 1974) (White, J., dissenting). However, while
state law can expand trademark rights, it cannot narrow or usurp federal rights, nor can it be
incongruous with Congress’s intent in enacting the Lanham Act. See e.g., Purolator, Inc. v.
EFRA Distribs., Inc., 687 F.2d 554 (1st Cir. 1982); Golden Door, Inc. v. Odisho, 646 F.2d
347 (9th Cir. 1980). See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 3, at § 22:2.
72
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own trademark laws as part of the general police powers granted by the
U.S. Constitution, a protection that falls within unfair competition
78
laws. Under New York state law, as under the federal Lanham Act, all
that is required to bring an action for unfair competition based on a
79
trademark is a likelihood of confusion, not actual confusion. In a preLanham Act opinion, the New York State Supreme Court Appellate
Division held that an alleged counterfeiter is liable “if the resemblance
is such as to deceive a purchaser of ordinary caution, or if it is
calculated to deceive the careless and unwary; and thus . . . injure[s] the
80
sale of the goods of the proprietor of the trade mark [sic].”
C. Trademark Infringement
A successful trademark infringement suit requires the plaintiff to
81
prove two elements under both Federal and New York law. First, the
defendant must have made use of the trademark by reproduction,
counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation in connection with the sale,
offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any good or service
82
without consent from the trademark holder. The requirement generally
means that the defendant must have closely associated the mark with
83
goods or services he was advertising or selling. Second, the plaintiff
must show that this use is likely to “cause confusion, or to cause
84
mistake, or to deceive.” There are a variety of factors that a court can
consider in determining if this element is fulfilled, including the
similarity of the marks in sight, sound, and/or meaning, the manner of
presenting the mark, the strength of plaintiff’s mark, the similarity and
sophistication of prospective purchasers, the cost of the goods, the
similarity of marketing channels, the alleged infringer’s good faith, the
defendant’s interest in entering the plaintiff’s market by using the mark,
85
and any evidence of actual confusion. Which factors are evaluated
78

U.S. CONST. amend. X; MCCARTHY, supra note 3, at § 5:3.
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 360-k (Consol. 2013); Allied Maint. Corp. v. Allied Mech.
Trades, Inc., 369 N.E.2d 1162, 1165 (N.Y. 1977).
80
Charles S. Cash, Inc. v. Steinbook, 220 A.D. 569, 572 (N.Y. App. Div. 1927).
81
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2005).
82
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20.
83
See id.; see also A&H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d
198, 211-12 (3d Cir. 2000); Frisch’s Rests., Inc. v. Elby’s Big Boy, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 648
(6th Cir. 1982) (citing AMF v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir. 1979)).
84
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a).
85
E.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elect. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961); see also
79
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varies in every jurisdiction, but courts always employ at least a few in
86
their assessment. Despite the many similarities between New York’s
trademark laws and the Lanham Act, there is at least one significant
difference: although federal law requires the mark to acquire secondary
meaning before it is afforded trademark protection, this is not a
87
requirement for an unfair competition trademark action in New York.
Furthermore, under New York penal law, there are three classes of
trademark counterfeiting—A, C, and E—and the degree depends on the
88
retail value of the good. The relevant section of the Penal Code states
that:
[a] person is guilty of trademark counterfeiting . . . when, with the
intent to deceive or defraud some other person or with the intent to
evade a lawful restriction on the sale, resale, offering for sale, or
distribution of goods, he or she manufactures, distributes, sells, or
offers for sale goods which bear a counterfeit trademark, or
possesses a trademark knowing it to be counterfeit for the purpose of
89
affixing it to any goods.

Despite clearly criminalizing the creation or sale of counterfeit goods,
the New York Penal Code makes no explicit reference to placing
criminal penalties on those who purchase or merely possess counterfeit
90
goods.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20; A&H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria’s
Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000); Frisch’s Rests., Inc. v. Elby’s Big Boy,
Inc., 670 F.2d at 647, 648 (6th Cir. 1982); AMF v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 (9th
Cir.1979).
86
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20.
87
Markel v. Scovill Mfg. Co., 471 F. Supp. 1244, 1249 (W.D.N.Y. 1979).
88
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.71-165.73. A crime is a class A misdemeanor where the
value of the counterfeited goods is less than one thousand dollars, a class E felony where the
value is between one thousand dollars and one hundred thousand dollars, and a class C
felony where the value exceeds one hundred thousand dollars. Id. New York’s penal law
also provides for the seizure and destruction of counterfeit goods upon conviction of the
counterfeiter. Id. § 165.74. In New York, a class A misdemeanor carries a possible prison
term of up to one year. Id. § 70.15(1). A class E felony carries a possible prison term of up
to four years. Id. § 70.00(2). A class C felony carries a possible prison sentence of up to
fifteen years. Id.
89
Id. § 165.71; see also id. §§ 165.72, 165.73.
90
Id. § 165.71.
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There are numerous defenses that can be used to avoid liability
once a plaintiff proves the elements of his trademark infringement
claim. Defenses include fair use, consent, abandonment, and equitable
91
common-law defenses such as laches and unclean hands. In a
successful trademark infringement action, a trademark owner may be
awarded an injunction or monetary recovery, including actual damages
92
for injury and the amount of the defendant’s profits, or both.
III.

The Practice of Selling Counterfeit Goods in New York
City

Vendors in New York City sell counterfeit goods in small shops,
from makeshift stalls along the street, and even from blankets laid out
on sidewalks. This practice has made New York City, especially along
Canal Street in Chinatown in Lower Manhattan, notorious as a major
93
hub of counterfeit operations in the United States if not the world. The
goods sold in New York City range from fake clothes to accessories,
including purses, watches, jewelry, and scarves, to luggage and
electronics.
Despite the illegality of the practice, tourist sites for visitors to
New York City peddle counterfeit goods shopping. For example, the
website NYC.com describes Canal Street as “an amazing open-air
bazaar,” and further explains to readers that “[i]f you’re wondering why
some of the dealers keep their most prized goods in attaché cases, it’s
because of frequent raids by US Customs and the New York City police
94
targeting dealers in counterfeit items.” Another website, New York
Show Tickets, further explains to tourists—and, presumably, locals—
where to buy imitation purses and how to spot a good-quality
95
counterfeit handbag. Despite touting this advice, the New York Show
91

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 28-32.
15 U.S.C. § 1114(2).
93
Aubrey Fox, The High Price of Counterfeit Goods, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Mar. 2008),
http://www.gothamgazette.com/article/crime/20080331/4/2476; Sara Kugler, NYC Police
Seize Over $1M in Fake Goods, USA TODAY (Feb. 26, 2008),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-02-26-3240627089_x.htm.
94
Canal
Street
–
Editorial
Review,
NYC.COM,
http://www.nyc.com/arts__attractions/canal_street.1312/editorial_review.aspx (last visited
Apr. 19, 2013).
95
Guide to Buying Fake Handbags in New York City, N.Y. SHOW TICKETS,
http://www.nytix.com/NewYorkCity/articles/handbags.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2013). It
should be noted, however, that other, arguably more upstanding websites, such as New York
Magazine, do not tout similar advice. In fact, a search ran in March 2012 on New York
92
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Tickets article does include a section entitled, “The Ethical Dilemma of
96
Buying A Fake Handbag.” However, the website does little to dissuade
potential buyers, and in fact states that, “[f]or the buyer, there is little
risk of prosecution, as no one has ever been charged in New York City
97
for buying a fake handbag, even though it is an illegal act.”
In recent years, officials in New York have attempted to crack
down on this growing industry via the Office of Special Enforcement
created by New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg in 2006 to
98
combat various “quality of life issues.” Between 2003 and 2005,
authorities seized over forty-five million dollars in counterfeit goods in
99
midtown Manhattan in New York City. In 2006, police confiscated
more than twenty-five million dollars in counterfeit goods, issued
100
seventy-five warrants, and made almost one hundred arrests. In 2007,
seven locations selling counterfeit goods were closed and five hundred
101
thousand dollars in fines was collected by the city. During the 2007
raids, the products seized included everything from DVDs and
102
computer games to apparel.
In February 2008, police raided three buildings in Chinatown and
confiscated more than one million dollars in counterfeit goods, the
majority of which were handbags, scarves, belts, watches, and
103
perfumes. Mayor Bloomberg called the raid location “one of the most
104
notorious knockoff shopping malls in the five boroughs.” This area in
Chinatown has been dubbed the “Counterfeit Triangle;” it is comprised

Magazine’s Chinatown neighborhood guide revealed little mention of the counterfeit goods
market. The Everything Guide to Chinatown, N.Y. MAGAZINE (Feb. 11, 2007),
http://nymag.com/guides/everything/27795/.
96
Guide to Buying Fake Handbags in New York City, supra note 95.
97
Id.
98
Mayor’s
Office
of
Special
Enforcement,
NYC.GOV,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/cjc/html/quality/mose.shtml (last visited Apr. 19, 2013). See
generally Tucker, supra note 4.
99
Tucker, supra note 4.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Sewell Chan, City Raids “Counterfeit Triangle,” Shutting 32 Storefronts, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 26, 2008), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/02/26/city-raids-counterfeittriangle-shutting-32-storefronts/; Kugler, supra note 93; Jefferson Siegel, Police Bust
“Counterfeit Triangle” on Canal St.; 32 Stores Padlocked, THE VILLAGER (Feb. 29, 2008),
http://thevillager.com/villager_252/policebustcounterfeit.html.
104
Siegel, supra note 103.
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of a group of several buildings, all owned by the same landlord. The
buildings house thirty-two shops that sell counterfeit goods and operate
over ten hours per day, seven days per week, and employ over 150
106
people. The February 2008 raid uncovered additional storage rooms
107
and backroom retail operations in the Triangle.
The crusade against the counterfeit goods market in New York
City shows no signs of slowing down. In July 2011, Apple, Inc. filed a
lawsuit against two stores, Fun Zone and Apple Story, in Queens, NY,
alleging that the stores sell accessories for Apple products branded with
108
the Apple, Inc. logo and other protected Apple marks. Although the
stores maintain that they did not violate trademark laws, a court-ordered
settlement compelled the stores to hand over their infringing products;
109
Apple Story was also required to change its name. Most recently,
nearly fifty vendors were arrested in Chinatown for selling goods they
110
allegedly believed were genuine. During a press conference after the
February 2008 raid, Mayor Bloomberg stated that “[t]his is the wrong
place to come if you want to buy stolen merchandise. We are not a place
111
that engages in criminal activity.”

105

Chan, supra note 103; Kugler, supra note 93; Siegel, supra note 103; Tucker, supra

note 4.
106

Siegel, supra note 103; Tucker, supra note 4.
Tucker, supra note 4.
108
Complaint at 8-11, Apple, Inc. v. Apple Story, Inc., No. 11-3550 (E.D.N.Y. Jul. 25,
2011),
available
at
http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/newyork/nyedce/1:2011cv03550/320338/1/; Apple Moves Against Knockoffs in New York,
REUTERS (Aug. 18, 2011, 7:04 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/18/appleknockoffs-idUSN1E77H1Y920110818.
109
Consent Order of Judgment and Permanent Injunction Against Defendants at 3, 4,
Apple, Inc. v. Apple Story, Inc., No. 11-3550 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2011), available at
http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/newyork/nyedce/1:2011cv03550/320338/33/; Apple Settles With Queens Stores Over Knockoffs,
REUTERS (Sept. 15, 2011, 5:04 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/15/applestorysettlement-idUSS1E78E1LV20110915.
110
Justin Chan, Chinatown Vendors Angry About “Angry Birds” Arrests, VOICES OF
N.Y. (Mar. 5, 2012), http://voicesofny.org/2012/03/chinatown-vendors-angry-about-angrybirds-arrests/.
111
Tucker, supra note 4.
107
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Proposal to Criminalize purchasing counterfeit goods in
New York City
A. General Background

In April 2011, at a New York City council meeting, council
member Margaret Chin, whose district includes Chinatown, proposed a
local law (“Intro 544”) to amend the New York City administrative
112
code to criminalize the purchase of counterfeit goods. The proposed
legislation, which is currently under review, would make purchasing a
counterfeit good a misdemeanor punishable by a fine, jail time, or
113
114
both. Ms. Chin hopes the law will be enacted by the end of 2013.
The aim of Intro 544 is to deter people from purchasing illegal
counterfeit goods that infringe on the trademark rights of other items in
the marketplace. Ms. Chin also believes that the legislation will stop
tourists from coming to Chinatown to buy counterfeit goods, and that
115
they will instead visit Chinatown for other, more respectable reasons.
In fact, in May 2011, the two community boards that cover the majority
of Ms. Chin’s District 1—Community Board No. 1 and Community
116
117
Board No. 2 —voted in support of Intro 544. Furthermore,
112

Int. No. 544 § 10-902; John Farley, Debate on City’s Counterfeit Goods Bill
Continues,
THIRTEEN
(July
10,
2011,
6:00
PM),
http://www.thirteen.org/metrofocus/news/2011/07/debate-on-citys-counterfeit-goods-billcontinues/.
113
Int. No. 544 § 10-902.
114
Narine Khngikyan, Buying Counterfeit Goods is Just No Good!, CONSUMER
ADVOCATE
LEGAL
UPDATE
(July
26,
2012),
http://www.consumeradvocatelegalupdate.com/2012/05/articles/consumer-fraud/buyingcounterfeit-goods-is-just-no-good/.
115
Farley, supra note 112.
116
New York City is made up of fifty-nine community boards, which are community
organizations that represent the interests of their community residents on a variety of issues,
including sanitation and street maintenance, zoning, and development and planning. Home,
CMTY. BD. NO. 1, http://www.nyc.gov/html/mancb1/html/home/home.shtml (last visited
Apr. 19, 2013). Community Board No. 1 covers nearly all of lower Manhattan below Canal
Street. Kasey LaFlam, Community Board #1 Map, CMTY. BD. NO. 1,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/mancb1/downloads/misc/Community_Board_1_Map.jpg
(last
visited Apr. 19, 2013). Community Board No. 2 is bound by Canal Street, 14th Street,
Bowery, and the Hudson River, and includes the New York City neighborhoods of
Greenwich Village, South Village, SoHo, NoHo, Little Italy, Chinatown, Hudson Square,
and Gansevoort Market. Home, CMTY. BD. NO. 2, www.cb2manhattan.org (last visited Apr.
19, 2013).
117
Biography
of
Margaret
Chin,
N.Y.
CITY
COUNCIL,
http://council.nyc.gov/d1/html/members/biography.shtml (last visited Apr. 19, 2013);
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Community Board No. 2 adopted a resolution in support of Intro 544, in
which it stated that the sale of counterfeit goods on and around Canal
118
Street in Chinatown has been a “serious issue over many years.” The
Community Board further stated that the illegal activity has led to
threatening behavior towards and the physical assault of local
residents and police officers by vendors, [and] a proliferation in other
criminal activity in the area . . . . [It also] impedes pedestrian traffic
on sidewalks and in crosswalks, blocks building access and egress,
119
and contributes to sanitation issues and other quality of life issues.

The Board and other proponents of Intro 544, including neighboring
Community Board No. 1, cite additional economic and ethical reasons
120
for their support of the legislation. They claim that the selling of
counterfeit goods has been connected to other organized crimes, such as
121
human trafficking, money laundering, and terrorism. The industry uses
child labor, causes harm to other legitimate local businesses, and has led
to over one billion dollars in lost tax revenue and 750,000 lost jobs in
122
New York City.
Kristoff Grospe, Proposed Law Targets Purchasers of Counterfeit Goods, 18 CITY LAW 1
(2012). Board 1 voted twenty-two to thirteen in favor of the proposed legislation, while
Board 2 voted unanimously in favor of the proposed legislation. Grospe, supra. Shortly
before the publication of this Note, Ms. Chin and lower-Manhattan residents petitioned for a
hearing on Intro 544. Kate Briquelet, Tourists Beware: Councilwoman Wants to Make it a
Crime to Buy Knockoff Handbags, N.Y. POST (Apr. 7, 2013, 8:49 AM), available at
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/manhattan/knock_it_off_shoppers_S0C161DwzGrvsC
xsLwujwM. Additionally, area residents and members of The First Precinct Community
Council initiated an online petition through the non-profit service SignOn.org in an effort to
garner support for passing the proposed law. Please Sign to Help Make it Illegal to Buy
Counterfeit Trademarked Goods, THE FIRST PRECINCT CMTY. COUNCIL (Apr. 8, 2013),
available
at
http://www.1stprecinctcc.org/please-sign-to-help-make-it-illegal-to-buycounterfeit-trademarked-goods/.
118
Resolution in Support of Intro 544, CMTY. BD. NO. 2, May 26, 2011, available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/mancb2/downloads/pdf/monthly_cb2_resolutions/may_2011/05_
may2011_environment.pdf.
119
Id.
120
Id.; Home, CMTY. BD. NO. 1, supra note 116.
121
Resolution in Support of Intro 544, supra note 118; see also JEROME P. BJELOPERA &
KRISTIN M. FINKLEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41547, ORGANIZED CRIME: AN EVOLVING
CHALLENGE
FOR
U.S.
LAW
ENFORCEMENT
3-5
(2012),
available
at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41547.pdf (citing the counterfeit goods market as a new
avenue of illegal activity linked to organized crime). In fact, New York Magazine labels
Chinatown a “crime epicenter” rife with a “massive scale of heroin importing, human
smuggling, prostitution, illegal gambling” in addition to its counterfeit goods market.
Dimitri Ehrlich, The Enduring Micro-City, N.Y. MAGAZINE (Feb. 11, 2007),
http://nymag.com/guides/everything/chinatown/27779/.
122
Resolution in Support of Intro 544, supra note 118; Farley, supra note 112; Fox,
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Opponents of Intro 544, however, fear that, if passed, the law
123
would be detrimental to the local community. The opponents believe
that New York City residents and tourists go to Chinatown to buy fake
goods, but that they also spend money at local restaurants, grocery
stores, and other legitimate local businesses, and that the criminalization
of purchasing counterfeit goods will negatively impact the local
124
economy. Moreover, critics of the legislation worry that its passage
will have a detrimental effect on the area’s small business owners and
residents, especially its poorest residents, because this industry is so
125
ingrained in the local economy in Chinatown. While Ms. Chin hopes
that tourists will flock to Chinatown to visit its other worthy attractions,
many fear that the neighborhood simply will not have enough left to
126
lure visitors.
As proposed, Intro 544 prohibits the actus reus of buying a
127
“tangible item containing a counterfeit trademark.” The proposed law
will apply to any trademark “registered, filed, or recorded” under the
laws of New York, any other U.S. state, or with the United States Patent
128
and Trademark Office. If passed, violating Intro 544 would be a Class
A misdemeanor, punishable by a criminal penalty of up to one year in
jail and a fine of up to one thousand dollars, a civil penalty of a fine of
129
up to one thousand dollars, or both. Each object or good purchased
130
can be considered a separate violation under the legislation.

supra note 93.
123
Farley, supra note 112.
124
Id.; Ashley Parker, Bill Aims to Make Buying Fake Designer Brands a Crime, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/27/nyregion/bill-aims-to-makebuying-fake-goods-a-crime-in-new-york.html.
125
Farley, supra note 112; Parker, supra note 124.
126
Farley, supra note 112; Parker, supra note 124.
127
Int. No. 544 § 10-902(a).
128
Id. § 10-901(c).
129
Id. § 10-902(b)(1).
130
Id. § 10-902(b)(2).
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B. Mens Rea Requirements
Intro 544 uses two alternative mens rea terms to define the
requisite mental state necessary for the crime of purchasing counterfeit
goods: “knows or should have known” that the goods were
131
counterfeit. The first term, knows, is relatively straightforward and
132
corresponds to the knowingly standard in the New York Penal Code.
It requires actual knowledge, or that, at the time of purchase, the actor is
133
essentially certain the good is counterfeit.
Understanding the requisite mental state necessary for the second
standard, “should have known,” is more complicated, and consequently
creates an obstacle for Intro 544’s effectiveness. The phrase “should
have known” is not a mens rea standard set out in the New York Penal
134
Code. Intro 544, however, states that, in New York City, the quality
and price of the item, the condition of the seller and the store, and the
store location indicate or should indicate to the buyer that the item is
135
counterfeit. Thus, when interpreting the plain meaning of the phrase
“should have known,” the standard implies negligent behavior as
136
defined by New York Penal Code section 15.05(4). New York courts,
however, have held that “should have known” should be interpreted as a
137
recklessness standard. For instance, in a 2009 patent case before the
131

Id. § 10-902(a).
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(2).
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Int. No. 544 § 10-902(a).
136
Andrew M. Stengel, Criminal Culpability’s Wild Mens Rea: Use and Misuse of
“Willful” in the Laws of New York, 4 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 779, 804-05 (2011); see also G.
Robert Blakely and Kevin P. Roddy, Reflections on Reves v. Ernst & Young: Its Meaning
and Impact on Substantive, Accessory, Aiding Abetting and Conspiracy Liability Under
RICO, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1345, 1621 app. D (1996) (equating the “should have known”
standard with negligence).
137
People v. Martin, 71 A.D.2d 928, 930 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (holding that, because
the defendant knew or should have known that the victim posed no danger, he acted
recklessly or with criminal negligence when shooting the victim). But see People v. Joseph,
172 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1958) (holding that “the recklessness requisite in a culpable negligence
manslaughter case requires proof of ‘knowledge’ or conscious awareness of risk. Evidence
which tends to prove that the defendant ‘should have known’ is admissible to prove actual
knowledge.”). In a 1996 case, a New York State Appellate Division court held that “[a]
violation of Labor Law § 220 is willful if the contractor acted ‘knowingly, intentionally or
deliberately’, and a contractor acts knowingly if it ‘knew or should have known’ that it was
violating the prevailing wage law.” Baywood Elec. Corp. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor, 649
N.Y.S.2d 28, 30 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (emphasis added) (quoting Tenalp Constr. Corp. v.
Roberts, 141 A.D.2d 81 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988)).
132
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Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, the concurring opinion criticized the
“should have known” standard as a simple negligence standard, “lower
138
even than the ‘gross negligence’ standard.” As a result of this
ambiguity and without further clarification of the meaning of the phrase
“should have known,” Intro 544 will be difficult to interpret, predict,
and apply, thus limiting the proposed law’s effectiveness.
C. Similar Laws in Other Jurisdictions
Georgia’s state code is the only one in the United States that could
be interpreted as intending to punish purchasers of counterfeit goods. It
imposes sanctions upon “[a]ny person . . . who purchases and keeps or
has in his or her possession with the intent to sell or resell any goods he
or she knows or should have known bear a forged or counterfeit
139
trademark . . . .” It is unclear, however, whether the mere purchase of
a counterfeit good is sufficient for punishment under this statute, or if
the buyer must also intend to sell or resell the item, and there appears to
be no case law that addresses the issue.
It may come as no surprise, however, that two of the world’s
fashion capitals—France and Italy—have laws that criminalize the
purchase of counterfeit goods. France, which is considered to have the
strictest anti-counterfeiting laws in Europe, explicitly prohibits
140
purchasing counterfeit goods. In France, a person can be fined or
141
imprisoned for “bad faith possession” of counterfeit goods. The
penalty for such an offense can be a fine of up to three hundred
142
thousand euros (approximately $391,422 USD) and up to three years
in jail for a person who “holds without legitimate reason, imports under
all customs procedures or exports goods presented under a [sic]
138

Larson Mfg. Co. v. Aluminart Prods., 559 F.3d 1317, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Linn,
J., concurring).
139
GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-454(c) (West 2013).
140
Amanda Silverman, Draconian or Just? Adopting the Italian Model of Imposing
Administrative Fines on the Purchasers of Counterfeit Goods, 17 CARDOZO J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 175, 199 (2009); Miles Socha & Sharon Edelson, Attacking Counterfeits: WalMart Unit Settles with Fendi Over Fakes, WOMEN’S WEAR DAILY (June 7, 2007), available
at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/76788330/fakes_arresting_wwd2; Tourists Warned Over
Fake Goods, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8215519.stm (last modified
Aug. 22, 2009).
141
Silverman, supra note 140, at 198-99 (citing Code de la propriete intellectuelle, art.
716-10 (Fr.), translated in http://195.83.177.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=36&r=2594).
142
Id.; Tourists Warned Over Fake Goods, supra note 140. Conversion calculated on
April 22, 2013 by www.xe.com.
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143

infringing mark.” In 2007, Michael Burke, the CEO of the Italianbased luxury brand Fendi, praised France’s criminal laws against
counterfeit goods, which he says successfully deter tourists from buying
144
such goods.
In Italy, France’s neighboring and fellow fashion-conscious
country, manufacturing, buying, and selling counterfeit items is very
145
common. The Italian intellectual property laws, especially those
governing counterfeit goods, have changed and advanced considerably
146
during the past ten years. Originally, it was a misdemeanor to
147
purchase property of suspect origin. The law set out to punish
“[a]nyone who, without previously ascertaining their legitimate origin,
purchases or receives, by any title goods that, due to their quality, the
personal condition of the seller or their price can reasonably be
148
suspected to originate from a crime.” Violators could face up to six
149
months in prison or a fine “not inferior to [€10.32].” Furthermore,
anyone who is negligent in failing to ascertain the origin of a good
“reasonably suspected to originate from a crime” could be subject to a
150
minimal fine or jail time.
151
In 2005, Italy added a more specific provision. That law states
that,
unless the act amounts to an offence, the purchase or acceptance
without previously ascertaining their legitimate origin, for any reason
of objects which, because of their quality or because of the condition
of the person offering them or because of the price, lead to believe
[sic] that laws on the origin and source of the good and on
152
intellectual property have been infringed . . . .
143

Silverman, supra note 140, at 198-99 (citing Code de la propriete intellectuelle,
supra note 141, at art. 716-10).
144
Socha & Edelson, supra note 140.
145
Silverman, supra note 140, at 182-83.
146
Id.
147
Id. at 187.
148
Id. (citing C.p. art. 712 (Italy), translated in Pier Luigi Roncaglia, Handling of
Counterfeit Goods: A Hands-on Problem for the Italian Criminal System, 92 TRADEMARK
REP. 1393, 1398-99 n.18 (2002)).
149
Id. at 187.
150
Id.
151
Silverman, supra note 140, at 188-89.
152
Id. at 188 (citing Decree-Law No. 80/05 of May 14, 2005, art. 1(7), Gazz. Uff.
No.111, (May 14, 2005), translated in Societa Italiana Brevetti, New Anti-Counterfeiting
Measures: Confiscation and Fines for Buyers of Fakes, UPDATES ON INTELLECTUAL AND
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY IN ITALY AND THE EU: TRADEMARKS (Italy), July 2005, at 1
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A violation of this law is punishable by a fine of up to ten thousand
153
euros (approximately $13,043 USD). Preliminary evidence indicates
that Italian authorities have been successful in imposing the new laws,
although it is unclear whether or not the laws have been effective in
curtailing the counterfeit goods market. A 2007 report by Italy’s High
Commissioner for the Fight Against Counterfeiting reported that there
were 11,728 administrative fines and 12,283 administrative seizures in
the first half of 2006 alone, indicating a high success rate of the
154
provision. However, these statistics are not limited to end-consumers
only, so it is unclear how truly effective this new measure has been in
achieving its goals of decreasing demand for and production of
155
counterfeit goods. Nonetheless, newspapers and travel websites have
reported that both Italian residents and tourists have received very large
156
fines for buying counterfeit goods. This is in stark contrast to New
York City travel websites that promote counterfeit goods shopping as a
157
tourist attraction. Perhaps if, instead of encouraging the sale and
purchase of counterfeit goods, New York City travel websites
discouraged such conduct, Intro 544 would be more effective.
V.

The Application of Intro 544’s Mens Rea Requirements

Intro 544 imposes punishment for two different levels of mens rea:
knowingly and should have known. The former is often used in criminal
statutes, while the latter is used less so. Under the knowingly standard,
the New York Penal Code requires that an actor have actual knowledge
158
of the circumstances, his actions, and their consequences. Because
“culpable” means the actor presently knows and knew at the time the
act was done that he did something wrong, it is appropriate for the law
[hereinafter Italian Decree-Law 80/05]).
153
Italian Decree-Law 80/05, supra note 152; conversion calculated on April 22, 2013
by www.xe.com.
154
See Silverman, supra note 140, at 189.
155
See id.
156
Id. at 188, 219 (citing Ing Svata Zdenek, Fake Products: Foreign Tourists Fined
10.000 for the Purchase of Goods of Dubious Origin, EUROPEAN CONSUMER CENTRE
PRAGUE
(July
31,
2006),
http://www.mpo.cz/zprava20307,
http://www.konsumenteuropa.se/Documents/Engelska/fake products.pdf)
(Italy has
streamlined the application of its law against purchasing counterfeit goods by most often
applying the highest possible fine).
157
See, e.g., Canal Street – Editorial Review, supra note 94; Guide to Buying Fake
Handbags in New York City, supra note 95.
158
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(2).
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to require, at a minimum, a knowing mens rea standard.
Some would argue, however, that Intro 544’s second mens rea
requirement, should have known, is too low of a standard to impose
criminal punishment from a retributivist perspective. Under the
retributive theory, punishment should only be meted out when one
subjectively has a guilty mind. However, as discussed below, one who
purchases a good under suspicious circumstances can be said to be
culpable for failing to recognize, or for recognizing and accepting, the
risk that the good she is purchasing may be counterfeit. The “should
have known” standard has a subjective component and looks to what the
actor actually knew about the context of the situation in which he
purchased the goods and whether those circumstances are sufficiently
suspicious that the actor is guilty for not having heeded the warning
written on the wall.
Utilitarians, on the other hand, may argue that deterrence cannot
occur unless one knows that she is doing something wrong. Though this
is true, public education programs regarding the harm and criminality of
dealing in counterfeit goods, as well as news of major arrests on the
front page of the New York Times, will surely create deterrence. In fact,
those who oppose Intro 544 often argue that the deterrence element will
work too well and Chinatown will lose its ability to attract visitors if
this illegal dealing is curtailed.
There are several reasons why permitting criminal liability under a
“should have known” standard is neither problematic nor inconsistent
with criminal law. First, although the phrase “should have known” is
160
not defined in the New York Penal Code, it can be given its plain
meaning: the person did not actually know what she was doing nor did
she understand the consequences of her actions, but that she
nevertheless should have known based on an objective analysis of the
161
circumstances. Moreover, the “should have known” standard is found

159
Although not relevant to this Note, the knowing mens rea standard also includes the
higher mens rea states of purposeful and intentional acts.
160
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05.
161
Note that the “should have known” standard is easier to satisfy than is the willful
blindness standard, which requires the actor to intentionally avoid learning of wrongdoing in
order to avoid legal consequences. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S.
Ct. 2060, 2070-71 (2011); United States v. Reyes, 302 F.3d 48, 54 (2d Cir. 2002). Courts
finding willful blindness sufficient to impose criminal sanctions have reasoned that a
defendant who intentionally avoids learning of wrongdoing is as culpable as one who has
actual knowledge of it. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2069.
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in several instances of criminal punishment stemming from supervisory
or contributory positions. Under “command responsibility” in
international criminal law, a leader may be found guilty of international
crimes for the acts of his subordinates if he “‘knew, or . . . should have
162
known’ that crimes had been or were going to be committed.” The
responsible corporate officer doctrine also imposes a “should have
known” standard for criminal liability for environmental crime on
163
corporate officers for violations of those they supervise. Finally, under
U.S. copyright laws, courts have held that a contributory infringer
should have known that the service allowed users to obtain copyrighted
164
material.
Second, many jurisdictions open the punishment door to lower
levels of mental culpability. Indeed, the New York Penal Code lists both
recklessness and criminal negligence as potential mens rea standards for
criminal punishment, both of which permit punishment without actual
165
knowledge that one is doing something wrong. Criminal negligence
entails risk taking, and Intro 544 implies the same, as it indicates that
jurors should look to whether the circumstances presented to the
defendant a risk that the goods were fake that the buyer did not heed.
The risk taking, or failure to perceive the risk, for criminal negligence
must constitute a “gross deviation from the standard of care that a
166
reasonable person would observe in the situation.” This same standard
is likely to be applied by jurors who have discretion and the power to
choose not to convict when the visible circumstances—price, quality,
sale location—do not clearly indicate that there was a risk that an item
is counterfeit. Thus, there will be a connection between subjective
culpability and liability for violating Intro 544.

162

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, art. 28(a)(i).
Janet L. Woodka, Sentencing the CEO: Personal Liability of Corporate Executives
for Environmental Crimes, 5 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 635, 650 (1992).
164
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
165
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(3), (4).
166
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(4) (emphasis added).
163
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As legal scholar John L. Diamond explained, negligence does
involve an inquiry into what a defendant actually knew:
[a]t bottom, negligence involves a judgment that, based on what the
actor knew, he or she should have known something else and should
therefore have known enough to have understood the obligation to
act more carefully. In spite of its concentration on objective
components, the baseline for negligence is the context as the actor
perceived it. Negligence, therefore, involves a subjective inquiry
(what the actor actually knew about the context) and an object
inquiry (the inferences that should have been drawn from what the
167
actor knew).

Thus, jurors, insofar as the retributivist theory is correct that persons are
concerned with punishing wrongdoers, will only find someone guilty of
a crime if they believe that the person did something wrong by ignoring
contextual factors that they actually knew of. If a jury concludes that the
evidence of what the defendant actually knew does not make him
culpable to some extent, the jury will not convict because a fundamental
principle of the retribution theory is that punishments are not imposed
unless the actor is culpable. Indeed, the statute specifically requires the
jury to consider the contextual information, such as price and sale
location, that was available to the actor.
Imposing a criminal penalty in this context is analogous to
someone who is so intoxicated that they unknowingly get behind the
wheel and cause an injury. Even though they were too drunk to
recognize the risk that they were taking by driving, they are still held
liable because, by choosing to drink in excess, they choose to take a risk
that they may unknowingly do something harmful when intoxicated. A
similar principle applies to someone who shops at stores that provide no
indicia of authenticity of their goods (or outward signs that the goods
are counterfeit): by purchasing without knowledge of authenticity, they
take a risk that they could be buying something that is illegal, even if
they do not know that is the case.

167
John L. Diamond, The Myth of Morality and Fault in Criminal Law Doctrine, 34
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 111, 121 (1997) (citing Peter W. Low, The Model Penal Code, the
Common Law, and Mistakes of Fact: Recklessneess, Negligence, or Strict Liability?, 19
RUTGERS L.J. 549, 549 (1988)). On the other hand, some scholars have argued that there is
little difference between “he knew” and “he should have known.” William S. Laufer,
Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds, 43 EMORY L. J. 647, 701-02 (1994) (citing Herbert
Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 128-29 (1968)).
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Although some may argue that people do not know that they risk
criminal liability by buying a counterfeit item being sold in such an
open manner as in Chinatown, ignorance of the law is never a defense
in criminal law. Thus, although some individuals may not realize that
buying counterfeit goods is wrong, a campaign to educate the public of
the harms of the counterfeit goods market and the illegality of buying
such goods is recommended. In fact, in May 2012, authorities in France
announced that ten thousand posters would be displayed in the
country’s eighteen airports to warn tourists of the illegality of
168
purchasing counterfeit merchandise. Similar education campaigns
have been successfully implemented in the United States to inform
consumers of the harms and potential liability for purchasing or
downloading illegally pirated music and movies. What may now not be
considered morally wrong by the majority of the U.S. population may
change as a result of an educational campaign.
Finally, there are crimes in which there is strict liability—liability
without mens rea—showing that a criminal mens rea is not an
indispensable element of every criminal offense. Under statutory rape
laws, for instance, one can be jailed for many years, even if he or she
did not know that the victim was not of legal age. The punishment for
that crime is far greater than the maximum penalty imposed by Intro
544, and the mens rea requirement is less. Thus, Intro 544 would not
stand alone in imposing criminal punishment without actual knowledge
that one is doing something wrong. Furthermore, Intro 544 requires
more than statutory rape laws because it requires a jury to determine a
defendant’s culpability in the context of surrounding circumstances,
such as the price and sale location of the goods, whereas statutory rape
does not.
VI.

The Criminalization of Purchasing Counterfeit Goods
Comports With Public Policy

Intro 544 and the criminalization of purchasing counterfeit goods
comports with public policy. Various members of New York City’s
government and community condone the city’s recent crusade against
the counterfeit goods industry. This support indicates that there is a
need for Intro 544 in the community, and that it will be backed by
many. Furthermore, Intro 544 furthers various intellectual property law
168

Jada Wong, France Fights Counterfeit Luxury Goods With New Ad Campaign,
STYLEITE (May 30, 2012), http://www.styleite.com/media/france-anti-counterfeit-ads/#0.
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goals. Finally, the proposed law simply marks another step in New York
City’s extensive crusade against the counterfeit goods market. In the
end, despite any drawbacks, it is clear that the potential positive effects
outweigh the consequences and favor a passage of Intro 544.
First, the success of similar laws in France and Italy serve as a
model for the potential success of Intro 544. Italian and other foreign
websites warn tourists that both citizens and tourists have been fined,
typically the maximum amount legally permitted, for purchasing
169
counterfeit goods in Italy. There is no reason not to believe that a
similar law would not be equally successful in the United States.
Furthermore, there are signs that the community and authorities will be
willing to work together to ensure Intro 544’s success. In the wake of
the most recent arrests in Chinatown in early 2012, Manhattan Borough
President Scott Stringer, State Senator Daniel Squadron, Councilwoman
Chin, and officers with the New York Police Department met with
community members in Chinatown to discuss the incident, during
which numerous community members expressed confusion about the
170
laws against counterfeit goods. Such transparency and alliance
between the community and various agencies will increase the
possibility for success and effectiveness of Intro 544. Moreover,
although it remains unclear whether or not these foreign laws will
produce large scale effects down the chain of sale and lead to a decline
in the manufacturing of counterfeit goods, it is conceivable that
decreasing consumers’ demand for counterfeit goods will lead to a
decrease in the supply of these products. Such effects will further
reinforce the purpose of Intro 544 and similar laws.
Second, Intro 544 is in line with the goals of intellectual property
and trademark laws, which seek to protect both trademark owners and
171
consumers. Criminalizing the purchase of counterfeit goods furthers
the objective to ensure that consumers are not confused by the source of
goods and are not duped by the quality or price of a good. Intro 544 also
reinforces a trademark owner’s rights over his mark. It protects the
mark owner’s economic interests, including the quantity of sales of the
169

Silverman, supra note 140, at 188, 219 (citing Svata Zdenek, Fake Products:
Foreign Tourists Fined 10.000 € for the Purchase of Goods of Dubious Origin, EUROPEAN
CONSUMER CTR. PRAGUE (July 31, 2006)); Tourists Warned Over Fake Goods, supra note
140.
170
Chan, supra note 110.
171
S.
Rep.
No.
79-1333,
at
3-4
(1946),
available
at
http://ipmall.info/hosted_resources/lipa/trademarks/PreLanhamAct_026_HR_1333.pdf.
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goods, the competitive price of the goods, and the goodwill the mark
owner has built-up as the result of time, creative, and economic
investment. Additionally, one of the most important goals of intellectual
property law is to create incentives for creation and invention. Intro 544
reinforces this by reassuring current and future trademark holders that
their marks and the time and money they spend to develop and
popularize the mark will not be compromised. The overall effect of this
betters the public marketplace of not only goods and services, but
furthers the country’s goals of innovation and creation. These
intellectual property goals will be protected by the enactment of Intro
544. As evidenced by the successes of similar laws in France and Italy,
Intro 544 will curtail the entire counterfeit goods market by dissuading
consumers from buying counterfeit goods, thereby decreasing the
demand for counterfeit goods.
Finally, Intro 544 and its sanctions are in line with increasing
172
federal efforts to curtail the counterfeit goods market. In late 2011, the
Obama Administration announced its public-education-focused
campaign against the sale and purchase of counterfeit and pirated
173
goods. At the White House announcement for the campaign, Attorney
General Eric Holder stated that, “[f]or far too long, the sale of
174
counterfeit . . . goods has been perceived as business as usual.” In
highlighting the harms of intellectual property crimes, Holder further
stressed that these crimes “destroy jobs, suppress innovation, and
175
jeopardize the health and safety of consumers.” As part of this
crusade, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency, the
Federal Bureau of Investigations, and U.S. Attorneys’ Offices banded
176
together to cooperate in an investigation called Operation In Our Sites.
On November 28, 2011, Cyber Monday, U.S. officials shut down 150
domain names of commercial websites allegedly selling counterfeit
goods; on Cyber Monday 2010, authorities shut down eighty similar
172
Stephanie Clifford, Officials Seize Counterfeit Holiday Goods, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/22/business/officials-seize-counterfeit-holidaygoods.html; Seth Stern, Campaign Against Fake Products Begun by Obama Administration,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 29, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-29/campaignagainst-fake-products-begun-by-obama-administration-1-.html.
173
Stern, supra note 172.
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Terry Frieden, 150 Domain Names Shut Down in Probe of Counterfeit Goods, CNN
(Nov. 28, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-11-28/tech/tech_websites-counterfietgoods_1_counterfeit-goods-phony-goods-websites?_s=PM:TECH.
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177

websites. Authorities placed banners on the seized websites to explain
why the site was shut down in an effort to educate consumers about the
illegality of selling and purchasing counterfeit goods; in the year that
followed Cyber Monday 2010, the banners received seventy-seven
million hits, an indication that the Operation is reaching millions of
178
potential consumers.
Some argue that, if passed, Intro 544 may in fact have detrimental
effects on the local community in areas of New York City, such as in
Chinatown, where selling counterfeit goods is common. Because selling
counterfeit goods along Canal Street is so engrained in the local
community, wiping out this industry would arguably destroy the
livelihood of many families. As previously stated, the Counterfeit
Triangle alone houses (or housed) at least thirty-two shops and employs
179
over 150 people. For these business owners and employees, losing
their job would be devastating, especially given the current economic
decline and high unemployment rate. Shutting down counterfeit
operations in neighborhoods like Chinatown may also have detrimental
effects on other legitimate businesses in the community, such as
restaurants, groceries, and legitimate shops. The patronage of not only
local residents will decrease at these establishments, but also that of
other New Yorkers and tourists who will no longer have a reason to
180
visit the area.
Despite these fears, the neighborhood will rebound if it indeed
suffers a decline due to the enactment of Intro 544, and New York City
will only be better from the further enforcement against counterfeit
goods. Efforts to assist the neighborhood and its residents who currently
depend on the counterfeit goods market will aid the local community in
making the transition. Although there may be an adjustment period,
New York City, and especially Chinatown, will benefit greatly from
Intro 544’s successful implementation.

177

Id. The term “Cyber Monday” was invented by a division of the U.S. trade
association National Retail Federation and was first used in ecommerce in 2005. Robert D.
Hof, Cyber Monday, Marketing Myth, BUS. WK. (Nov. 29, 2005),
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/nov2005/nf20051129_9946_db016.htm.
This new holiday occurs every year on the Monday after Thanksgiving and Black Friday
and is one of the biggest online shopping days of the year. Id.
178
Frieden, supra note 176.
179
Tucker, supra note 4.
180
Farley, supra note 112.

ESTACIO NOTE FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

410

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

6/14/2013 12:54 AM

[Vol. 37:2

CONCLUSION
The counterfeit goods industry is rampant in New York City, and
Intro 544 is simply another part of the crusade against it. Although some
may argue that the mens rea term “should have known” creates an
uncertainty in the legislation that will make Intro 544’s enforcement and
effectiveness questionable, this is not the case. Based on the successes
of similar laws in Italy and France, Intro 544 will be an effective,
enforceable law that will fulfill the retributive and utilitarian goals of
criminal law. Although its proposal has already garnered negative
policy attention, Intro 544, bolstered by community support and public
awareness, will only aid New York City’s campaign against the
counterfeit goods industry and further the goals of intellectual property
law.

